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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI 
Amici submit this brief as amicus curiae pursuant to Fed. R. 
App. P. 29 (a) and Rule 29 of this Court. Amici are professors of law 
at law schools in the United States. They have concentrated their 
academic work in patent law, civil procedure, and constitutional law. 
Given their expertise in these areas, amici offer the Court a unique 
perspective with respect to the issues presented in the litigation. 
Erika R. George is a Visiting Professor of Law at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law. She teaches Civil Procedure and 
Constitutional Law among other subjects. She has written in the 
area of constitutional law. 
Kali N. Murray is an Assistant Professor of Law at Marquette 
University Law School where she teaches Patent Law among other 
subjects. She has written on the standing of public interest groups 
under the Patent Act of 1952, the Administrative Procedure Act and 
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
Amici, pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Court, certify, that all 
relevant parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A person, whose invention or discovery, is a useful "process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter", or any new and useful 
improvement" of the same may obtain a patent, see 35 U.S'.C. § 101, 
unless the patent is one that claims information that concerns the 
"laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3325, 177 L.Ed. 792, 95 U.S. P.Q.2d 1001 
(2010). These exceptions remain a key "threshold" inquiry, see 130 
S.Ct. at 3225, under Section 101 because these exceptions protect 
information that is "alike open to all", Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 
175 (1853), and thus, should not removed from "the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men." Funk Bros. Seed. Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 131 (1948). These exceptions exist, then, to prevent 
"monopolies of expression" that may prevent searching inquiry in 
variety of expressive contexts, such as the scientist's laboratory, or the 
intimacy of a doctor's office. See David Lange and H. Jefferson Powell, 
No Law: Intellectual Property in the Image ofAn Absolute First 
Amendment 305 (2009). Therefore, under those circumstances, where 
. judicial consideration of an inventive claim involves one of the relevant 
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exceptions, an appropriate element of a Section 101 inquiry, may be to 
determine its impact on the expressive elements associated with a 
patent under the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
The various plaintiffs, within the context of their declaratory 
judgment action have alleged a number of significant harms. First, 
the research organizations at issue have claimed that Myriad's 
enforcement of its patents in basic genetic information prevents their 
members from undertaking academic inquiry into the relevant claims 
of Myriad's respective patents. Second, the individual researchers 
and clinicians claim that Myriad's enforcement of its patents has 
chilled research and compromised communications with patients. 
Finally, the individual plaintiffs themselves are denied access to 
information important for making crucial medical decisions with 
respect to an appropriate course of care in consultation with their 
health care providers. The District Court's exercise of jurisdiction 
below was proper because under totality of circumstances, the limits 
placed on the Plaintiffs' freedom of expression presented by continued 
validity of Myriad's patents establish a substantial controversy 
between the adverse legal interests between the parties of sufficient 
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immediacy and reality to warrant judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  This Circuit Must Examine The District Court's 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, Under the Totality of Circumstances, 
Which Includes the Collective Plaintiffs' Claims Under 
the First Amendment. 
This Court has followed the Supreme Court's holding in 
MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (citing 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 
(1941», which provides that actions brought under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 2201(a)(2006), should be examined to 
determine "whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, 
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant 
the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Id. at 127. Since Med-
Immune,. this Court has adopted a "totality of circumstances" standard 
to assess whether a case or controversy exists under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. Cat Tech, LLC. V. Tube Master, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 
880 (Fed. Circ. 2008)("The Court explained that whether a declaratory 
judgment action contains an Article III controversy must be 
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determined based on "all the circumstances.") The "totality of 
circumstances" test is a flexible approach that allows this Court to 
consider multiple factors in its jurisdictional approach. See, e.g., Cat 
Tech, 528 F.2d at 881 (a factor to be considered under the "totality of 
circumstances" is "meaningful preparation to conduct potentially 
infringing activity"); Prasco, LLC., v. Medicis Pharmaceutical, Corp., 
537 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(a factor to be considered under 
the "totality of circumstances" test is "a reasonable apprehension of 
suit.") 
We contend, here, that a significant factor to be examined as to 
whether the District Court's jurisdictional approach should be upheld, 
amongst the other factors, is the collective Plaintiffs' claim that 
Myriad's enforcement of its patents rights, under Section 101, violates 
their First Amendment rights (as discussed in more detail, supra, 
below). Initially, such an inquiry would be consistent with this 
Court's flexible inquiry under the "totality of circumstances" test. 
Moreover, the First Amendment has been increasingly been 
understood to be relevant to threshold inquiry of Section 101. For 
instance, as Justice Mayer of this Court suggests in his dissent in In re 
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Bilski, problematic patents, such as so-called "business method" 
patents, can raise a substantial claim under the First Amendment, 
because such patents allow: 
private parties to claim exclusive ownership of ideas and 
practices which rightfully belong in the public domain. "It is 
a matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the 
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable." 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765,96 S.Ct. 1817, 
48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Thus, "the stringent requirements 
for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public 
domain remain there for the free use of the public." Aronson 
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 99 S.Ct. 1096, 
59 L.Ed.2d 296 (1979). 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1008 (2008)(Mayer, J., dissenting); 
Laboratory Corp. ofAmerica Holding v. Metabolite Laboratory, et. al., 
548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006)(Breyer, J.,dissenting (Exceptions to Section 
101 "reflects a basic judgment that protection in such cases, despite its 
potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere 
with, or discourage, development and the further spread of useful 
knowledge itself.") 
Notably, the standing of parties, under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act or otherwise, to raise the First Amendment, is 
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understood to be broad. Courts have been vigilant in barring 
impediments to freedom of expression to facilitate the "free trade in 
ideas" and promote competition in the "marketplace of ideas." Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Accordingly, First 
Amendment jurisprudence disfavors laws, policies and practices that 
would block access to the marketplace of ideas or diminish the 
information and ideas that make it into the market. In interpreting 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court, as well as other circuit 
courts, has expanded the availability of standing where restraints 
exist that that risk "chilling" the right of free expression. Virginia v. 
American Booksellers, Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 384 (1988)(pre-
enforcement standing and exception to "injury in fact" requirement 
granted where booksellers allege,d an infringement of the First 
Amendment rights of book buyers); Sec'y of State of Md. V. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,956 (1984) ("When there is a danger of 
chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be 
avoided whenever possible may be outweighed by society's interest in 
having a statute challenged and litigants may then assert the rights of 
others."); Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003)(Activist 
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suffered requisite "injury in fact" to have standing where claim to 
injury was threat of future prosecution under a hate-crimes statute 
and activist alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct 
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed); 
Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 57 (1 st Cir. 2003) ("As to 
whether a First Amendment plaintiff faces a credible threat of 
.prosecution, supporting standing, the evidentiary bar that must be 
met is extremely low: courts will assume a credible threat of 
prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary evidence"). 
Two circumstances demonstrate the relatively lenient standard 
as to standing within the context of the First Amendment. First, 
plaintiffs may bring a pre-enforcement challenge where constitutional 
interests are at stake. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 
(1973)("Plaintiffs may have standing even if they have never been 
prosecuted or actively threatened with prosecution."); Berner v. 
Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1997)(standing to seek declaratory 
relief where "parties remain [ed] philosophically on a collision course" 
and plaintiff would continue conduct in controversy, but for policy 
prohibiting the conduct). Great weight is to be given to the danger of 
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self-censorship because of the potential 'chilling' effect a measure may 
have on protected activity. LSD, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1156 
(9th Cir. 2000) ("We have noted that the tendency to find standing 
absent actual, impending enforcement against the plaintiff is stronger 
"in FirstAmendment caSeS, '[f]or free expression-of transcendent value 
to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights-might be 
the loser." (citations omitted) Indeed, a "First Amendment plaintiff 
who faces a credible threat of future prosecution suffers from an 
'ongoing injury resulting from the statute's chilling effect on his desire 
to exercise his First Amendment rights.'" Ward, 321 F.3d at 1267 
(quoting Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 946 (lOth Cir. 1987». 
Courts have even recognized injury sufficient to sustain standing 
in the First Amendment context where plaintiffs claim that they have 
forgone expression so as to avoid the consequences of enforcement. 
Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1283 (lIth Cir. 2001)("Plaintiffs do not 
have to expose themselves to enforcement in order to challenge a law. 
Rather, an actual injury can exist when the plaintiff is chilled from 
exercising her right to free expression or forgoes expression in order to 
avoid enforcement consequences. In such an instance, which is what is 
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alleged here, the injury is self-censorship"). Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that a potentially coercive threat may be associated 
with the claim of an enforcement of a patent, even where the claimed 
action is between two private parties. See Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 
130-35. 
Second, a plaintiff may bring a declaratory judgment action 
where a First Amendment claim is prompted by an actual existence of 
a controversy. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-59 
(1974)("actual controversy" within the meaning of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act where the threat of prosecution for distributing 
handbills was not imaginary or speculative); New York Times v. 
Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 167 (2nd Cir. 2006) (no abuse of discretion in 
entertaining declaratory judgment action where First Amendment at 
issue and declaration would finalize controversy). 
Here, the collective Plaintiffs' claims range from a pre-
enforcement challenge to actual threat of enforcement. While under 
some circumstances, these claims would not be sufficient under this 
Court's "totality of circumstances" standard, see Innovative Therapy, 
Inc., v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1380-1383 (Fed. Cir. 
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2010), the broad standards typically associated with claims brought 
under the First Amendment suggest the necessity of a different result 
under the circumstances alleged by the collective Plaintiffs. This is 
particularly true, as the Justice Ginsburg, noted in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003), the governmental grant of a patent does 
differ in kind from the grant of a copyright, insofar as the grant of a 
patent prevents the "full use by others of the inventor's knowledge." 
Therefore, it is only appropriate (as may be the case here), within the 
context of a Section 101 "threshold" inquiry to ensure that the 
governmental grant of a patent does not unduly limit the First 
Amendment rights of others. 
II.  The District Court Properly Exercised Declaratory 
Judgment Jurisdiction since Myriad's Alleged Acts 
Violate the First Amendment Rights of the Plaintiffs 
and Establish the Existence of Adverse Legal Interests 
Between the Parties that are in Real and Immediate 
Controversy. 
A controversy exists between the parties not only because Myriad 
has previously taken action to protect against infringement of its 
patents (A35-36; A61-62; A2850-52; A2888-93;) and the plaintiffs are 
presently prepared to take infringing action                  A1283); but also 
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because the plaintiffs have been deterred from engaging in further 
inquiry and have ceased certain constitutionally protected 
communicative conduct to avoid infringing the patents at issue. 
(A2773-74; A2979-80; A1284, A2676-74; A7271-73; A2777, A2937-38; 
A2982-83: A3037-38; A1284). 
A.  Myriad and the Collective Plaintiffs Have Adverse 
Legal Interests. 
1.  The Plaintiff Physicians and Patients Enjoy a 
Protected Freedom of Expression in the 
Physician-Patient Relationship that is 
Compromised by Myriad's Patents. 
The First Amendment "right to receive information" is central to 
a "threshold" inquiry under Section 101. Numerous Supreme Court 
cases allude to a right to receive information grounded in the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. "The right to know or to hear or 
receive information, is in theory one of the principal underpinnings of 
the First Amendment, but it has usually remained in the shadows of 
legal battles over free speech and press."l The Supreme Court's 
holding in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
lAmerican Meat Institute v. Ball, 424 F.Supp. 758, 769 -770 (D.C. 
Mich. 1976) 
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Consumer Council, Inc., remains a frequently cited case that supports 
the right to receive information. There, the Court clearly articulates 
that the First Amendment protection enjoyed by advertisers seeking to 
disseminate information is also enjoyed by and could be asserted by 
consumers. Id. at 782.2 
The "right to receive information" presumes that the freedom of 
expression protects the exchange of ideas and information. 
Accordingly, the First Amendment protects communication "to its 
source and to its recipients both."3 Another important point is that 
2The Supreme Court also recognized the right to receive information 
before Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396,408-09 (1974) (overruled on other grounds) (censorship of 
prison inmates' mail infringed the rights of non-inmates to whom mail 
was addressed); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) 
(American scholars have right to hear, speak, and debate alien 
Marxian theoretician with no personal entry right); Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969) (public has right 
to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other 
ideas through broadcast media); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 
(1969) (right to receive information and ideas extends to possession of 
obscene materials in one's own home); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 
U.S. 301 (1965) (citizens have First Amendment right to receive 
communist political publications from abroad). 
3Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (U.S. 1976) 
("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a 
speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the 
13 
"[t]his right [to receive] is an inherent corollary of the rights of free 
speech... the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the 
sender's First Amendment right to send them."4 But this right is "a 
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own 
rights of speech, press, and political freedom."5 
Some courts have conditioned the right to receive on the presence 
of a willing speaker. In Pennsylvania Family Institute v. Black, the 
court finds no violation of a "right to listen" when there is no "willing 
speaker."6 Here, willing speakers exist among the plaintiffs who wish 
to share information (A3034-25; A3036-40; A1284; A7-17; A2775-77), 
so even if the right to receive is understood as only derivative as 
extended to patients, it can be derived from those of researchers and 
physicians. 
An early formulation of the right to receive information was 
advanced in the context of the physician-patient relationship. In 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.") (footnote  
omitted).  
4Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v.  
Pica, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (emphasis in original).  
5Id. (emphasis in original).  
6489 F.3d 156, 165 (3rd Cir. 2007).  
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Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held the "right of freedom 
of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but 
[also] ... the right to receive ..."7 In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the 
Supreme Court opined that "in a variety of contexts this Court has 
referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas'" 
and that "'[i]t is now well established that the Constitution protects 
the right to receive information and ideas."'8 
The right to receive information, then, is a "fundamental right" 
because a market of sellers alone becomes one that is "barren" of 
exchange.9 Simply put, "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
7 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) ("The right of freedom of speech and 
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to 
distribute, the rightto receive, the right to read and freedom of 
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach -indeed the freedom 
of the entire university community. Without those peripheral rights 
the specific rights would be less secure. And so we reaffirm the 
principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.") (citations omitted). 
8408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). 
9 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (concurring, 
Brennan) (citations omitted)("It is true that the First Amendment 
contains no specific guarantee of access to publications. However, the 
protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to 
protect from congressional abridgment those equally fundamental 
personal rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully 
meaningful. I think the right to receive publications is such a 
fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing 
15 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee."lO 
The First Amendment protects recipients' rights regardless of the 
social worth of that information. Indeed, even information that could 
potentially harm others is constitutionally protected. ll 
The Supreme Court has rejected restraints on freedom of 
if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider 
them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers 
and no buyers."). 
lORed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) 
(citations omitted) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee... 
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. 
That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or 
by the FCC."). 
llStanley, 394 U.S. at 564 ("It is now well established that the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. 'This 
freedom (of speech and press) * * * necessarily protects the right to 
receive * * *.' This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of 
their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.") (citations 
omitted); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 846 (1997) (citations omitted) 
("Although the Government has an interest in protecting children from 
potentially harmful materials, the CDA pursues that interest by 
suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional 
right to send and receive."). 
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expression that would place physicians in an "undesired and 
uncomfortable straightjacket." Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). Because it remains the responsibility 
of physicians to ensure that appropriate information is conveyed to 
their patients based on the condition of the patient, City ofAkron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983) the 
Supreme Court has consistently cleared "obstacles in the path of the 
doctor" upon whom patients are entitle to rely for advice in connection 
with health care decisions. Id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 
n. 33 (1977)). In the physician-patient relationship, patients expect 
that physicians will not withhold relevant information regarding care 
options and consequences. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 211 n. 3 
(1990) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) ("in our society, the doctor-patient 
dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust... each of us attaches 
profound importance and authority to the words of advice spoken by 
the physician.") Id. at 218. 
In Conant v. Walters, a recent case where, as here, the interest in 
information exchange in the context of the physician-patient 
relationship was adverse to other legal intere·sts, the Court of Appeals 
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for the Ninth Circuit upheld the issuance of an injunction to protect 
First Amendment rights. In Conant, the controversy was, inter alia, 
over a statutory prohibition on the ability of doctors to offer counsel as 
to the use of medical marijuana to their patients. Writing in 
concurrence, Judge Kozinski noted that "the right to hear-the right to 
receive information-is no less protected by the First Amendment than 
the right to speak" as "the right to hear and the right to speak are flip 
sides of the same coin."12 However, "the harm to patients from being 
denied the right to receive candid medical advice is far greater than 
the harm to doctors from being unable to deliver such advice." 13 where 
"for patients who suffer from horrible disabilities .... enforcement of 
federal policy [would] cut such patients off from competent medical 
advice and leave them to decide on their own ..."14 
Conant is instructive here because the plaintiffs seeking to share 
information about the predisposition to breast or ovarian cancer allege 
they have been constrained by an improvidently granted federal 
patent that permits Myriad to enforce its legal interests. (A1284). 
12 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 
13 Id. 
14Id. at 644. 
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While researchers and physicians would like to offer gene testing, they 
are ultimately constrained by patent restrictions. (A149; A15l; A1284). 
Patients are left to make decisions on their own from a position of 
uncertainty without the benefit of full information because of various 
barriers to accessing the genetic testing offered exclusively through 
Myriad. (A20-25; A 1594-95; A1598-99; A1602-3; A1606-7; A16l0-ll; 
A16l4-l7; A160; A2652; A2937-38; A3065; A3072-73; A3077; A285l). 
While cancer patients may seek information from other sources, any 
such sources would be "poor substitutes for a medical doctor; 
information from chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss 
of individualized advice from a physician with many years of training 
and experience."15 
B.  Plaintiffs Allegations Demonstrate a Controversy of 
Sufficient Immediacy and Reality Under The Totality of 
the Circumstances. 
Myriad, in its primary brief, argues that·its past actions and 
plaintiffs' subjective fears are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
Br. Appellant at 22-24. The past actions of Myriad, though constitute 
a real, immediate and sufficient threat to warrant for declaratory relief 
15Id. 
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in this context. Myriad's actions have an actual chilling effect on 
communications between researchers, physicians and their patients. 
Courts evaluate a variety of factors to determine whether a 
plaintiff faces a realistic threat of direct injury to confer standing in 
the First Amendment context. LSO, LTD v. Strogh, 205 F.3d 1146, 
1155 (9 th Cir. 2000). These factors include: (1) evidence of past 
enforcement; (2) the continuing present adverse effects of any such 
efforts; and (3) the injury of self-censorship, if the plaintiff is chilled 
from exercising the right to self censorship. Id. (standing where 
officials did not expressly disavow intent to impose sanctions on 
plaintiffs); Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1283. Enforcement history alone, 
though, is not dispositive. For insta?ce, the Supreme Court in 
Virginia v. American Booksellers, found standing because First 
Amendment rights were implicated even though the challenged 
provisions had never been enforced against anyone. 484 U.S. at 393. 
A number of these factors exist here. First, Myriad's affirmative 
actions in the past inform the plaintiffs' perception of the potential 
risks associated with infringement and the assertion by Myriad of its 
legal interest. The District Court found the record established that 
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"within the research community... Myriad has taken the position that 
any BRCA1I2 related activity infringes its patents and that Myriad 
will assert its patent rights against parties engaging in such activity." 
(A63-64). In the context of First Amendment abridgment "[h]arm to 
free speech rights ... [are] not measured solely in economic terms, nor 
must concrete punishment be meted out to confer standing to sue. The 
right to speak one's views freely is so fundamental that the spectre of 
punishment, or the uncertainty created.. .is injurious as well." Mallick 
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 644 F.2d 228, 235 
(3rd Cir. 1981). 
Second, Myriad's previous affirmative actions have "chilled" 
specifically, the freedom of expression enjoyed by patients and 
physicians. The plaintiffs here are not just researchers but serve in a 
dual capacity as clinicians as well with responsibility to care for 
patients. This is a relationship where communication is crucially 
important. Here, chill is evidenced by physician's silence on matters of 
importance to patients, prompted by a fear of induced infringement 
under the Patent Act. Indeed, at least one of the plaintiffs' that she is 
unable to make disclosures to her patients. (A13). 
21 
Myriad makes much of its past actions being in the past, but the 
present looks as it does because Myriad's conduct has chilled 
physicians into a self-induced silence. Myriad need not take 
affirmative actions today because their conduct yesterday was so 
effective as to stop any significant effort to share information among 
the plaintiffs. The credible threat of present or future prosecution itself 
works an injury in the First Amendment context suffiCient to confer 
standing. Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Federal Election 
Commission, 113 F.3d 129, (8th Cir. 1997). 
Far from having a subjective fear over what Myriad may do, the 
plaintiffs have actually changed their conduct because of what Myriad 
did and may do in the future. (A1284; A2773-74; A2979-80). The 
consequences of Myriad's conduct to enforce its legal interests have 
created a specific and present objective adverse legal interest. 
Specifically, Myriad has created an impediment to free and full 
information and communication sharing in the care relationship 
between patients at genetic risk for cancer and the physicians who 
coordinate their diagnosis and treatment. Allegations are not of a 
subjective chill but rather an actual freeze as the collective Plaintiffs 
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in interest claim to have changed their conduct in accord with the risk 
posed by Myriad. (A1284; A2650; A2753; A2775;A2813; A2828; A2850-
51; A2888-92; A2934-36; A2978-81;A3022; A3035-36). Plaintiffs 
remain without express assurances that no action will be taken by 
Myriad. Br. Appellant at 33 n.12. 
It is, in this context, immaterial that Myriad's prior litigation did 
not name any of the present plaintiffs in this action because, as 
discussed infra, courts have treated standing under the First 
Amendment under a lesser degree of scrutiny, given the fundamental 
rights at stake. Risk of chilling the dissemination of information is an 
immediate reality. The Complaint specifically alleges that the risk of 
Myriad's enforcement constrains conversations between patients and 
physicians.l6 (A13). 
First Amendment claims are different such that plaintiffs here 
are injured when it is widely understood that Myriad may assert its 
patent rights against parties engaged in sharing information 
concerning breast or ovarian cancer predisposition, yet they cannot 
16The District Court specifically noted that "[b]ecause of the patents-in-suit, Dr. 
Chung does not tell the research subjects in her studies the results of the analysis 
of their BRCA genes." (A13). 
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know when they are at risk of running afoul of Myriad's rights. 
Similarly, that Myriad says it "may never sue the plaintiffs at all", Br. 
Appellent at 29, is particularly troubling in this context as it operates 
only to continue the uncertain circumstances of the collective plaintiffs 
here  because the adverse legal interests alleged are First Amendment 
claims. 
Plaintiffs have alleged more than "an inchoate desire to do 
something in the future if these patents are invalidated" as Myriad 
represents. See Br. Appellant at 21. Plaintiffs here have their lives at 
stake and the desire to make informed decisions about care and 
treatment. The immediate and real injury is the impediment the 
ongoing validity of the Myriad patents place on freedom of expression 
in the patient-physician relationship. This lack of access to information 
can be traced to Myriad's coercive conduct. 
III.  The District Court Properly Applied the "All the  
Circumstances" Test.  
For the reasons detailed above, the District Court did not (as 
Myriad argues) improperly expand the "all the circumstances" test. 
The District Court properly applied the test given that the continuing 
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validity of Myriad's patents may curtail freedom of expression in the 
critical relationship between physician and patient. 17 
The plaintiffs are in precisely the situation the Declaratory 
Judgment Act was designed to address. It is not sufficient for Myriad 
to say that it "may never sue at all" in the context of an First 
Amendment claim. See Br. Apellant at 29. Here, Myriad's affirmative 
act is to place physicians in the position of practicing medicine and 
conducting research under the sword of Damocles. The uncertainty 
over whether or not Myriad will enforce its patents make its coercive 
action continuous and places the plaintiffs in ever-present peril. 
Myriad's suggestion that "this is a manufactured controversy 
17The District Court's determination, however, that a theory of 
constitutional avoidance precluded review, once jurisdiction was 
appropriate, may have been in error. (see, e.g., A242-44) As discussed 
infra, we contend that a First Amendment inquiry is an aspect of the 
Section 101 inquiry, and so therefore, should have been considered 
within the scope of the District Court's determination. Here the 
constitution is inescapably at issue because the determination that the 
patents were invalid is at is essence a constitutional issue. Myriad's 
patents are invalid because the information they permit Myriad to 
withhold from others remains outside the scope of patentable subject 
matter yet it remains within the scope of what is protected by the First 
Amendment where there is a strong preference for the dissemination 
of information and ideas. 
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with recruited plaintiffs" bent on advancing the agenda of "public 
advocacy groups effort to use the courts to dictate public policy on DNA 
patents" precisely misses the point. (Myriad Br. at 30) Courts have 
permitted pre-enforcement challenges finding in the First Amendment 
context injury sufficient to confer standing where, as here, there is a 
credible threat of present or future liability. See, infra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed in part and remanded for further determination of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims. 
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